

# **Individual and Bilateral Surpluses from Trade**

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## Utility function.

$$u(c, \frac{m}{P}) = \frac{\alpha}{1+\alpha} c^{\frac{\alpha-1}{\alpha}} + \frac{1}{1+\alpha} \left(\frac{m}{P}\right)^{\frac{\alpha-1}{\alpha}}$$

## Marginal utility of services:

$$\frac{\partial u}{\partial c} = \frac{\alpha}{1+\alpha} \frac{\alpha-1}{\alpha} c^{-1/\alpha}$$

→ buyer takes away from trade

## Marginal utility of money.

$$\frac{\partial u}{\partial m} = \frac{1}{1+\alpha} \cdot \frac{\alpha-1}{\alpha} \left(\frac{m}{P}\right)^{-1/\alpha} \frac{1}{P}$$

← aggregate price level

For a transaction at price  $p^n$  (price norm), utility is

$$p^n \cdot \frac{\partial u}{\partial m} = \frac{p^n}{P} \cdot \frac{1}{1+\alpha} \cdot \frac{\alpha-1}{\alpha} \cdot \left(\frac{m}{P}\right)^{-1/\alpha}$$

All households hold  $\mu$  units of money, so seller experience utility.

$$p^n \frac{\partial u}{\partial m} = \left(\frac{p^n}{P}\right) \frac{1}{1+\alpha} \frac{\alpha-1}{\alpha} \cdot \left(\frac{\mu}{P}\right)^{-1/\alpha}$$

↑  
seller takes away from trade.

If there was no trade (required to compute surplus).

- seller gets 0.

- buyer gets  $p^m$  units of money, which provides utility:

$$p^m \frac{\partial u}{\partial m} = \left(\frac{p^m}{p}\right) \frac{1}{1+x} \cdot \frac{\varepsilon-1}{\varepsilon} \cdot \left(\frac{N}{p}\right)^{-1/\varepsilon}$$

- Seller enjoys surplus from trade:

$$S = \left(\frac{p^m}{p}\right) \frac{1}{1+x} \cdot \frac{\varepsilon-1}{\varepsilon} \cdot \left(\frac{N}{p}\right)^{-1/\varepsilon}$$

All prices are the same, given by price man, so  $p^m = p$ .

$$S = \frac{1}{1+x} \cdot \frac{\varepsilon-1}{\varepsilon} \cdot \left(\frac{N}{p}\right)^{-1/\varepsilon}$$

$$S > 0$$

- Buyer enjoys surplus from trade:

$$B = \frac{X}{1+x} \cdot \frac{\varepsilon-1}{\varepsilon} \cdot c^{-1/\varepsilon} - \left(\frac{p^m}{p}\right) \frac{1}{1+x} \cdot \frac{\varepsilon-1}{\varepsilon} \cdot \left(\frac{N}{p}\right)^{-1/\varepsilon}$$

$$B = \frac{1}{1+x} \cdot \frac{\varepsilon-1}{\varepsilon} \cdot \left[ X c^{-1/\varepsilon} - \left(\frac{p^m}{p}\right) \left(\frac{N}{p}\right)^{-1/\varepsilon} \right]$$

$$B = \frac{1}{1+x} \cdot \frac{\varepsilon-1}{\varepsilon} \cdot \left[ X c^{-1/\varepsilon} - \left(\frac{N}{p}\right)^{-1/\varepsilon} \right] \quad (\text{all prices are same})$$

FOC from household's problem: (used to compute AD curve)

$$X c^{-1/\varepsilon} = [1 + \tau(x)] \left(\frac{N}{p}\right)^{-1/\varepsilon}$$

$$B = \frac{1}{1+\chi} \cdot \frac{\varepsilon-1}{\varepsilon} \cdot \left[ (1+\tau(\alpha)) (\nu/p)^{-1/\varepsilon} - (\nu/p)^{-1/\varepsilon} \right]$$

$$B = \frac{1}{1+\chi} \cdot \frac{\varepsilon-1}{\varepsilon} \cdot \tau(\alpha) \cdot (\nu/p)^{-1/\varepsilon}$$

$$B > 0$$

Conclusion:

- seller surplus:  $S > 0$
- buyer surplus:  $B > 0$
- total surplus from matches:

$$T = S + B > 0$$